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IT’S ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP: 
COLLABORATIVE LAW IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT†
BY: MARCIA L. MCCORMICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Work is central to Americans’ identities. Whether that centrality is a byproduct of
the Protestant work ethic, a byproduct of our drive for more, or something else, work
defines, at least in part, who we are.  It gives us moral worth in the community, and it1
plays a large role in our internal views of self-worth.  And although this was not always2
the case, work is the primary way that most of us support ourselves.  In other words,3
while at the founding of this country, most people were self-sufficient, growing much of
their own food, making many of their own goods, and trading for the rest rather than
working for someone else for wages, at least since World War II, almost no one
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continues to be self-sufficient, and the vast majority of people work for someone else.4
Thus, work drives us in fundamental ways. And the workplace, as a result,
dominates our lives. We are spending ever greater amounts of time in the workplace and
less time in civic and social engagements.  As a consequence, our relationships at work5
have become so significant that they are nearly as important to us as our family
relationships.  In fact, the employment relationship is similar to the family relationship in6
the emotional support from coworkers it can provide and in the financial support it
provides. Because the employment relationship is so common and psychologically so
important to us, employment disputes are especially difficult and sensitive for both
employers and employees. Moreover, disruptions in employment wreak real financial
havoc in people’s lives and can significantly disrupt the operations of a business as well.
Given these factors, trials, with their delays, uncertainties, and expenses look less
attractive as a method dispute resolution than they otherwise might. From the perspective
of the courts, the potential caseload posed by employment disputes also makes trials an
unattractive choice for resolution. Accordingly, alternative forms of dispute resolution
COLLABORATIVE LAW 3
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(ADR) play a dominant role in resolving and avoiding labor and employment conflicts.
This paper, building on the comparison of the employment relationship to the
family relationship, focuses on one newer form of ADR, the collaborative law process,
and explores its application in the employment context. Collaborative law, as the name
implies, is not adversarial and has been used in family law where continuing relationships
are an important outcome of the resolution process. Part two of this paper outlines the
various forms of ADR, part three details the specific features of the collaborative law
process, and part four suggests some possibilities and limitations of using that process in
the employment setting. Although collaborative law will probably not transform labor
and employment conflicts the way it has some family law matters, there is, nonetheless,
significant value to be gained by adapting it.
II. FORMS OF ADR
The standard means in this country for resolving large disputes is through the
court system in the form of trials. ADR methods were developed as alternatives to
litigation and had become a popular topic with fairly wide use by the mid-1980s.7
Although they are framed as alternatives to litigation, many of these alternatives might be
pursued before, during, or in conjunction with litigation in progress. 
ADR has been so heavily used in the employment context, that it is an important
part of any employment law or labor law course. Soon, the subject will also be an
essential component of any other employment-related field as well. The reasons for
4 COLLABORATIVE LAW
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they get compensated much more quickly, or because they may believe the employer in
an informal setting that the issue is a personnel problem, rather than legal problem, and
their legal claim is not that strong. Employer representatives often recast the issues in this
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ADR’s popularity in the employment context are many, but essentially boil down to the
fact that ADR is attractive to employers, and employers have the power to funnel
disputes into alternative fora by making agreement to their use a condition of
employment.
Employers have good reasons for finding ADR attractive. Litigation is expensive,
and even litigation that is quickly dismissed imposes costs on the defendant. A successful
lawsuit can result in significant damages, and the defendant could also be liable for the
plaintiff’s attorneys fees and costs.  Additionally, lawsuits and adjudications are matters8
of public record, which inevitably impair the employer’s public image. Finally, resolution
of a dispute can take years. ADR will usually generate much smaller legal fees, and may
result in smaller awards.9
Courts find ADR attractive as well. The number of employment cases filed in
courts has expanded dramatically. For example, between 1990 and 2000, in federal
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courts, the number of employment civil rights cases filed grew by over 250%.10
Finally, employees may find ADR attractive, too.  Employees receive awards or
gain settlements more often in ADR than in court.  ADR is more cost efficient and11
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This is the default rule governing arbitration agreements, but because parties to14
an arbitration agreement can define the process of arbitration and its effect, there is
nothing to stop parties from agreeing that an arbitration would not be binding or would
be reviewable by the courts.
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accessible to employees.  ADR is more likely to allow the parties to keep the details of12
the conflict and its resolution secret, which may be important to employees alleging
harassment or disputing some terminations. And finally, the process of ADR can be less
stressful than litigation and bring greater psychological satisfaction to the employee.13
ADR is not a single uniform approach. Many different models of dispute
resolution have been crafted, and because people can agree to use any process they can
imagine, the possible permutations could be as varied as every single dispute. Generally,
though, dispute resolution processes can be grouped into somewhat loosely organized
categories defined by the essential procedures and goals. 
The largest category of processes is arbitration. Arbitration is truly an alternative
to a trial. Pursuing, or even agreeing to pursue it forecloses the ability of the parties to
engage in litigation.  Arbitration is an adversarial process, similar to a trial, but much14
less formal. The parties present their cases to a neutral third party, the arbitrator, who
issues a decision that is binding on the parties. The parties, generally, contract in advance
for the process, and the procedures will be defined by that contract. Usually the parties
COLLABORATIVE LAW 7
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are allowed limited discovery, and at the arbitration, the rules of evidence do not apply.
Some arbitral awards are reported, but most are not. Arbitral awards can be reviewed by
courts but only on an incredibly deferential standard. Mistakes of law or fact will
ordinarily not be enough. The award will be set aside only if the arbitrator exceeded his
or her authority under the contract or enforcement of the award would violate a clear and
dominant public policy.
Neutral fact-finding is something like arbitration, in that a neutral third party
decides what has occurred either after reviewing evidence submitted by the parties or by
conducting an independent investigation. The fact-finder does not issue a binding
resolution of the dispute, although he or she might make a recommendation about the
outcome.
Mediation is one more step removed from the trial model. It is an alternative to
trial in the sense that it is not formal litigation, but engaging in it does not foreclose
litigation, and mediation can even be used as a part of the litigation process. It could
alternatively be used as part of the arbitration process; once all of the issues that can be
mediated are, the mediator becomes an arbitrator and makes a binding decision on the
issues that remain.  Mediation can be adversarial, but it need not be. Like an arbitrator or
neutral fact-finder, the mediator is a disinterested third party, but unlike those, a mediator
does not make any findings or impose any decision on the parties. Rather, the mediator
seeks to help the parties reach an agreement, and while in some instances a mediator may
issue a recommendation, that recommendation is not binding and does not foreclose
8 COLLABORATIVE LAW
Janet G. Payton, Business Laws, Inc., Overview of Alternative Dispute15
Resolution in the Employment Context, Corp. Counsel’s Guide to Alt. Disp. Resol. in the
Emp. Context (Second) (BLI) 1.007-.008 (Nov. 2005).
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subsequent litigation. There is no discovery nor is evidence presented. A mediator may
meet with the parties all together or shuttle between the sides, caucusing. The mediator
may facilitate the negotiation process, seeking concessions from the parties, a process
called conciliation or caucus mediation, or helping them to identify their interests to see
how both sides can be served, a process called transformative mediation.
Mediation can be administered within a company, and companies use other more
inquisitorial processes to resolve disputes, as well. Some use an Ombudsman who
receives, investigates, and proposes settlement of disputes.  Others use an internal15
grievance procedure, where employees can file complaints internally, and a multi-step
process proceeding along the company’s hierarchy is used to resolve the complaint.
Although this process is most often used in a union setting, it has been adopted in non-
union settings as well. The philosophical underpinnings of the grievance process are that
they reduce arbitrariness in decisionmaking and they grant employees procedural due
process, all of which make employees feel that they have been treated fairly.
The last category of ADR is the most removed from the trial or inquisitorial
models. Negotiation without any intermediary may not be thought of usually as a method
of ADR, in part because it is a process inherent to litigation. However, to the extent that
the negotiation resolves the parties’ dispute in whole or in part, it serves as an alternative
to trial. Negotiation often takes place in an adversarial context, even though it may not
COLLABORATIVE LAW 9
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always be cast in those terms because there is no third-party decisionmaker. Negotiation
need not be adversarial, and the different models are discussed in greater detail below.
The primary focus of this paper is one of these models of negotiation: collaborative law.
10 COLLABORATIVE LAW
MELISSA L. NELKEN, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION 59 (2001).16
See id. at 60-62, 69-73.17
See generally Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J.18
DISP. RESOL. 325; Gary T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process,
Strategy, and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69 (1982).
NELKEN, supra note ___, at 59-60.19
DRAFT: 10/1/06
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  COLLABORATIVE LAW 
AND OTHER FORMS OF ADR
A. Types of Negotiation
The traditional model of negotiation is adversarial and is viewed as a zero-sum
game.  That is, the pie of resources that the parties are negotiating over is a fixed size,16
and every piece that one side gets reduces the other side’s share by the size of that piece.
This type of bargaining is called distributive or positional bargaining.
The parties are competing for the largest amount of this fixed pie of resources that
they can get and come into the discussions with a set position from which to begin
bargaining. The primary strategy used in positional bargaining is to get as much
information about what the other party is willing to give up without revealing anything
about your own position.  Thus, secrecy, bluffing, posturing, and exaggeration are all17
tactics that are commonly used, tactics that heighten rather than resolve conflict.  The18
end result, if success is reached at all, is some kind of compromise at a point somewhere
in between the minimum each party would have settled for.19
Even taking positions at all influences the way a negotiation will play out.
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Deciding on a position makes a party view the issues narrowly. It also creates a bias, in
effect wedding people more solidly to their positions.  Even when positions are set20
arbitrarily, people use those positions as benchmarks and expect the final values to be
close.  Every step that a party must retreat from the initial offer will feel like a bit of a21
loss.22
Interest-based negotiation, on the other hand seeks to expand the possibilities and
serve the underlying interests of both parties. Instead of working on the premise that the
parties are adversaries fighting over fixed resources, interest -based negotiation
endeavors to have the parties view themselves as problem solvers, working together to
solve a common problem. And so, rather than focus on a single goal to be achieved, in
interest-based bargaining, the parties negotiate the process and generate a variety of
possibilities before negotiating which to choose.  23
The first goal of interest-based negotiation is to separate the people from the
problem, to consider the diversity of perspectives, the hostility, and the potential for
12 COLLABORATIVE LAW
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unclear communication in the discussions.  Doing this helps to protect the process from24
getting caught up in the egos of the parties, which can be a primary obstacle to
agreement.  The tendency of negotiations to get caught up in the egos of the parties also25
can damage the parties’ ongoing relationship.  26
In addition to these effects, separating the people from the problem enables the
parties to more accurately hear what the other side is saying, which allows them to see
the issue from the perspective of the other side better.  Acknowledging emotions of both27
sides and being explicit about the role of emotions in the discussion also facilitates
communication and maintaining focus on the things that will allow the parties to come to
an agreement.  28
The second goal of interest-based negotiations is to focus the discussion on the
interests of the parties, broadly defined, rather than on positions. The parties’ interests are
what really define the problem and cause parties to take their positions in the first place.29
And usually, parties will have interests that coincide or interests that are compatible in
COLLABORATIVE LAW 13
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addition to those that conflict.  Focusing on those interests and serving as many of the30
parties’ interests as possible is what leads to agreements that the parties will support. 
The third goal of interest-based negotiations is to open the universe of possible
resolutions as wide as possible. Without positions, the parties brainstorm to create as
many options as they can before they discuss which options to choose.  Although it may31
seem difficult, the parties divorce the process of deciding from the process of creating
options that might resolve the conflict. In this way, there is less chance of the parties
developing entrenched positions. 
The fourth goal of interest-based negotiation is to rely on criteria for resolution
that are outside of the parties. Inevitably, some interests of the parties will conflict, and
they may not be able to brainstorm a way to resolve that conflict. When that happens, the
parties must instead rely on objective criteria to pick which interest to serve.  Relying on32
the will of the parties, which is what positional bargaining does, is likely to sabotage any
agreement, and even if it does not, is more likely to lead to an agreement destined to fall
apart. Relying on objective criteria, such as market value, professional standards,
precedent, or what a court would decide, or some other standard that is outside of the
parties themselves.33
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B. The Collaborative Law Process
The collaborative law process is a set of practices and agreements that
collaborative lawyers use to frame an interest-based negotiation and protect it from
devolving into positional bargaining. The collaborative law process was pioneered by
Stuart Webb, a family law attorney in Minnesota in 1990,  and has been further refined34
by Pauline Tessler, a California lawyer.   The practice has developed a devoted35
following among family law attorneys, and although collaborative lawyers have
suggested that the model would be a good way to resolve employment conflicts, the
process has not yet been widely adopted there.
Collaborative lawyers receive training in interest-based negotiation, conflict
resolution communication skills, and the particular procedures involved in collaborative
practice. Ideally in a dispute in which collaborative practice is used, the parties are each
represented by counsel trained in collaborative law. Sometimes, collaborative lawyers
will work with an attorney who has not been trained and who expresses a willingness to
seek training or at least to follow the model, but the process works best if both attorneys
COLLABORATIVE LAW 15
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have had this training.
The key feature of the process is that the parties and their attorneys sign a binding
agreement that they will try in good faith to resolve their dispute without resorting to or
threatening to resort to litigation.  If the parties resort to litigation, they must release36
their attorneys and hire new counsel. As the parties invest ever greater time and energy
into the process, the threat of having to hire new counsel provides a powerful incentive to
see the process through the difficult spots.
In addition to the participation agreement, the process involves a series of four-
way meetings with the parties and their attorneys. The attorneys occasionally confer
briefly without their clients to set the initial agenda and to refine the discussion process
along the way. The job of the attorneys during these meetings is to help the clients
identify their interests and communicate respectfully, but most of the actual negotiation is
driven by the parties, rather than by the attorneys. The parties may also jointly retain
financial or counseling experts or others to facilitate various parts of their agreement. As
part of the participation agreement, these experts and the parties agree that the experts
will be not be available if the parties resort to litigation.
The process has more substantive features that facilitate agreement, as well. As a
part of the initial participation agreement, the parties agree to full disclosure of
information and to include relational and long term interests in the final agreement
reached by the parties. They also agree to work together to reach an agreement that best
16 COLLABORATIVE LAW
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serves both parties’ interests. The end product of the successful process is an agreement
that either eventually becomes a court order or can become a binding contract.
While the collaborative law process might seem substantially similar to traditional
settlement negotiations or to mediation, it differs in some very important respects. First,
the lawyers do not structure the topics or the process of discussion. Rather, they try to
keep that power in the hands of the clients. Second, traditional negotiations and even
mediations often happen with the parties in separate locations, and the lawyers
communicating by telephone or fax, or a mediator shuttling from one to the other. This
process, conversely, happens primarily face-to-face. Third, the parties are not subject to
the same kinds of litigation deadlines, and so the pace can be more casual and the parties
can be encouraged to think through the issues more thoroughly. Finally, and most
importantly, the collaborative law process is not adversarial, but is interest-based
bargaining. The difference between interest-based negotiation and positional bargaining
is what gives collaborative law so much promise for effective dispute resolution.
The absence of a mediator and the fact that both parties have counsel may make
the collaborative law process look inefficient compared to mediation, where the parties
often are not represented by counsel. We tend to assume that the neutral party facilitates
the process of compromise by providing a perspective that the parties lack and by being
able to gain more accurate information from the parties about their positions. Thus, the
absence of a neutral party might suggest that the dispute would take longer to resolve and
the parties would throw up more roadblocks to compromise. The communication
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dynamic, as well, might seem strange to lawyers unfamiliar with the process, because we
are so much more familiar with positional bargaining and compromise. It is difficult to
see how four parties with two interests and no neutral outsider could negotiate
effectively.
These differences are assets, though, in the context in which they are practiced.
Because parties are represented by their own counsel, they trust more that their interests
are being protected than if they did not have an attorney. At the same time, it is more
difficult for the attorney to impose his or her views on the client, since the clients shape
and conduct most of the negotiation, while the attorneys facilitate the communication and
provide legal information necessary to resolve the issues. Because the clients are more
likely to feel protected but empowered, they are more likely to be satisfied with the end
result.
The most significant aspect of the collaborative law model is the form that the
negotiation takes: interest-based, rather than positional bargaining. The goal in interest-
based bargaining is not compromise, but rather serving the primary interests of both
parties to the maximum extent possible. Full disclosure of facts is required, and the
parties are less negotiating then they are problem solving. Although the dynamic is not a
natural one for litigation-trained attorneys, it can yield results that the parties are very
satisfied with.37
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IV. COLLABORATIVE LAW IN AN EMPLOYMENT SETTING
Collaborative law would be attractive in an employment setting for all of the
reasons that other alternatives to litigation are attractive: it is less costly and more
accessible than litigation; it is quicker than litigation; it can serve the interests of the
parties more easily than can the process of litigation with its focus on rights; and it is less
harmful psychologically than the stress of litigation can be. In addition to these reasons,
collaborative law might help to guard against some of the dangers that other forms of
alternative dispute resolution might pose to employees.
Several scholars have suggested that alternative dispute resolution is likely to
harm employees. Arbitration can favor employers over employees because only
employers are repeat players, likely to hire an arbitrator in the future.  This repeat player38
effect may encourage arbitrators to side with an employer in interpreting the law or to
minimize an award made to an employee. In mediation, where there is no compelled
discovery, an employer can maintain a monopoly on the information about the dispute. In
addition, studies have demonstrated the way that employer run mediation-style dispute
resolution mechanisms can subvert employees’ claims, reinterpreting them as personality
conflicts and management issues in a way that convinces employees that they have no
right at stake.  Thus, mediation can simply magnify the power differential that already39
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exists in the employer/employee relationship. Additionally, to the extent that employees
realize that their interests are not being served, they will not be satisfied by any
resolution achieved through the employer process.
The collaborative law process could avoid those problems to some extent because
the employee is represented by independent counsel. There is less likely to be a repeat
player bias if the employee has the power to pick his or her own lawyer for the process.
The process is less likely to be reinterpreted as a personality conflict or a management
issue, and more likely to give effect to the rights the law provides. The employee is also
less likely to feel that the process is weighted in the employer’s favor, since the employee
has counsel, and there is no third party pressuring the two sides to reach a particular
agreement.
The other features of the process also protect employees. The full disclosure of
information by the parties puts the parties on more even footing for the negotiating
process. Additionally, the focus on the interests of the parties, in the shadow of the law as
an objective tie-breaker, allows the parties to craft an agreement that might not be
possible in a court. And because the negotiation is conducted primarily by the parties, the
process itself may assist in making the employee feel more empowered. Finally, because
of the type of negotiation and the method of communication involved, the relationship
between the employee and the employer will survive the process and may even grow
stronger.
Collaborative law still imposes dangers similar to other methods of ADR,
20 COLLABORATIVE LAW
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however, and will not be workable in every employment situation. First, the public
interest may be harmed by removing a conflict about an employee’s rights out of the
public domain and into a private setting. The resolution agreed to may not recognize or
vindicate the legal right at stake, and that legal right is not just the employee’s; it is also a
right of the public. The resolution and the reasons for it may not be published, so that the
public will not know about the conflict or how the resolution fits in with or deviates with
norms about the legal rights. Moving a large number of employee conflicts into private
resolution channels may keep those norms from developing at all, or may hide significant
portions of the norms from public view.
There are also dangers to the employee. If the employee expects that the process
will vindicate his or her rights because he or she is represented by counsel, the employee
may not realize where the legal rights might be subverted to serve both parties’ interests.
Counsel for either the employee or employer is not adept enough at the collaborative law
process to keep it from devolving unnecessarily or unknowingly to positional bargaining. 
Thus, there may be a problem of false consciousness, whereby the process could serve
the employer’s interests at the cost of the employee’s, but the employee may be unable to
perceive that, relying on the presence of counsel as some indicator of fairness and power.
In addition to these dangers, there are practical impediments to the use of
collaborative law in an employment setting. The largest impediment is money. Especially
in a discharge, employees will rarely have the financial resources to hire a lawyer. The
legal power that employers have over employees is also an obstacle to using the
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collaborative law process. Employers may not see the utility in a process that may be
more expensive than mediation if they see little chance that the employee has any sort of
legal claim. One solution to the money problem might be for the employer to provide
referrals for attorneys and even pay for the attorney the employee chooses, as long as it is
a collaborative lawyer, through an employee assistance program. Employers have little
incentive to do so, however, where mediation may be less expensive or the employer has
a strong chance to avoid liability by not volunteering any information.
Some types of employment disputes will be more amenable than others to use of
the collaborative law process.  The conflict most amenable would be the negotiation of an
employment arrangement. In that situation, the parties’ interests clearly overlap to a great
extent, the employee is more likely to want to retain a lawyer at least where there will be
a contract, and the parties are entering into a relationship that they want to thrive.
After that, it would seem that the best candidates for collaborative law would be
in collective actions concerning compliance, the health and safety of the workplace, or
arranging the terms and conditions of work. In those instances, as well, the parties’
interests are likely to overlap and the health of the continuing relationship is important.
The greatest obstacle to the use of collaborative law in a collective context could be the
National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits joint employer employee decisionmaking
in areas that are mandatory subjects of bargaining, such as wages, hours, and the terms
and conditions of work.  The collaborative law process may not violate the NLRA, but40
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the process might have to be modified to make clear that the ultimate authority in those
areas was management’s. That, in turn, might undercut the effectiveness of relying on the
collaborative law process.
For individual employee conflicts, the best fit for the collaborative law process
might be in seeking accommodations for religious reasons, accommodations because of a
disability, or leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. Other likely candidates may be
disputes about benefits under the employer’s benefit programs. Again, the parties’
interests are likely to overlap significantly, and both parties have an interest in a future
relationship.
Layoffs and terminations may seem the least likely candidates for the
collaborative law process. The interests of employee and employer would seem very
likely to conflict, and there is significantly less interest in the continuing relationship.
Additionally, the immense power of employers to discharge employees and the lack of
legal rights possessed by employees would give employers little incentive to agree to the
collaborative process, much less fund it. However, even in layoffs and terminations,
employers may have incentives to engage in the collaborative law process, where, for
example, layoffs are a somewhat cyclical event and today’s laid off employees will be
next weeks new hires. Additionally, in those instances in which employees may have a
legal right, or it might appear to the public that employees should have some right,
employers will have an interest in resolving the situation to the employee’s satisfaction,
and controlling dissemination of the information about that termination. The
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collaborative law process can serve both of those interests.
Finally, even after something has occurred that would give an employee a legal
right to recovery, the parties may have an interest in resolving their conflict through
collaborative law. In the context of harassment, in particular, employers and employees
both may have strong interests in keeping the details a secret. Moreover, those kinds of
workplace harms often require more of a healing process than some other types of
conflicts. The collaborative law process, to the extent that it empowers the employee, can
facilitate that healing.
And beyond the context of harassment, employers may have incentives to propose
using the collaborative law process when they learn of impending litigation. For all of the
reasons that ADR is attractive, generally, collaborative law will be attractive. It might be
less attractive than mediation or even arbitration where the employee’s case seems weak,
but the increased employee satisfaction that can result from the process might offset the
advantages of the other forms of ADR if the conflict could continue to disrupt the
workplace during and after its resolution.
The employment context will require some modifications of the process, which
will be developed more as I work on future drafts:
!Exhausting administrative remedies/tolling
!Limiting the use of information disclosed during the process
!Waiving litigation/releases
!Vindicating public rights/involving agencies in the release
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!Ethical issues
V. CONCLUSION
The collaborative law process has been very effective at resolving conflicts in
relationships where the parties have an interest in maintaining a good relationship.
Because employment relationships are nearly as important as family relationships, a
method of ADR that can protect them has much to offer the employment setting.
Collaborative law will not work for every employment dispute, but it has the potential to
give employees significant voice, and is a useful option to consider.
